To enable the verification of authentication protocols, Schneider formulated the rank function approach which could be used, under suitable circumstances, to verify protocols modelled using the process algebra CSP. We develop this theoretical result and extend it to a practical framework which can be used to model and analyse a wider variety of security protocols with respect to a wider range of security specifications than were hitherto possible. These results are achieved using PVS, which also provides tool support for the rank function approach.
It was realised at an early stage in the history of security protocols that they were susceptible to extremely subtle flaws, and that formal techniques were needed to investigate their properties. The need for formal techniques is even greater today due to the increased liabilities. Perhaps the most widely publicised success of formal methods in the security domain is Lowe's attack on the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol [11] , and this has been used as a benchmark for other analysis techniques ever since. Such ingenuity started a 'gold rush' in the search for other attacks. As a consequence, techniques for verifying protocol correctness have been, until recently, overshadowed by attack-motivated techniques.
As the subject matures it is reasonable to expect an increased interest in methods that are capable of verifying protocol correctness. Methods such as the rank function approach of [18] have already proven to be successful in the quest for protocol correctness. This approach, in the context of the modelling language Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [9, 17, 19] , is our starting point. The principal contribution of this paper is to extend the approach's versatility by developing its underlying theory, and improve the scalability of the approach by using the Prototype Verification System (PVS) theorem prover [13] as a formal, interactive environment in which proofs are constructed. Section 2 gives an overview of the common features of security protocols together with their aims. This is followed by a definition of the relevant parts of the CSP language. We then consider the rank function approach, as presented in [18] , and its implementation in PVS [3] . In Section 3, we develop a new suite of rewrite rules and PVS strategies for the rank function approach. These rules are polymorphic with respect to CSP events and are, therefore, independent of any specific network architecture. As such, it is possible to construct a variety of rank theorems for specific security properties and specific network architectures without the need to alter the PVS embedding. This is demonstrated by using the rules to derive the rank theorem defined in [18] . Sections 4 and 5 investigate the applicability of the results of Section 3 to two new areas: Section 4 develops a rank theorem for the analysis of non-repudiation of origin properties, and Section 5 develops a rank theorem for the introduction of a notion of time. A small example of a rank analysis is included in Section 5.
Background
A security protocol consists of a series of communications between two or more agents on a network whose aim is to achieve one or more security goals. Protocols can be classified according to their cryptographic mechanisms (e.g. shared key or public key protocols), the nature of the agents involved (e.g. whether a trusted third party or server is needed), the number of communications required (e.g. one-pass or two-pass protocols), or the kinds of properties that the protocols are intended to fulfil (e.g. one-way or mutual authentication).
The characteristics of a protocol are determined by the contents of the messages that are exchanged during a run of the protocol. Such messages will typically include identity information (the names of the agents involved in the run), freshness identifiers (indicating how old the messages are), labels to uniquely identify the run of the protocol, and short-term session keys. Of course, some of these message components will occur in an encrypted form.
CSP
The environment in which security protocols are run is complex. A typical network consists of a large number of components each of which can act independently or interact with other components. The complexity of the system arises from the nature of the possible interactions. Fortunately, from a formal methods point of view, we can abstract away many of the physical aspects of the system to perform analyses at a higher, more conceptual level. However, we must be careful not to abstract too much and risk overlooking potentially hazardous interactions (i.e. breaches of security). CSP combines a conceptual clarity with a solid semantic foundation; it is within this framework that we investigate security protocols formally.
Notation
The language of CSP is used to define processes. A CSP process is a formal object or entity which exists in isolation or interacts with its environment by performing atomic actions called events. The classic example is the vending machine [9] : we can model a vending machine as a CSP process and model its visible (external) behaviour as a set of events. The event coin could represent the machine accepting money from its environment, and the event choc could represent the machine dispensing a bar of chocolate.
The interface (or alphabet) of a process P , denoted by σ (P ), is the set of events that P may engage in. In the early versions of CSP, the alphabet of a process was given explicitly. Modern practice leaves the alphabet of a process implicit (i.e. within the process definition itself).
Stop
The simplest CSP process is Stop-its behaviour is to do nothing.
Event prefixing
If P is a process and a is an event then a → P is a process that can perform the event a and then behave as P . For example, the process coin → (choc → Stop) corresponds to a vending machine which accepts a coin, dispenses a chocolate bar and then ceases its operation. Note the causal dependence of the event choc on the event coin.
A notion of input and output can be introduced if we consider structured events of the form c.v, where c is the name of a channel and v is the value of a message passing along the channel. Each channel has a type which corresponds to the possible values that can pass along it. We can now define two new kinds of prefixing: the process c!v → P outputs the value v on channel c and then behaves as P , and the process c?x : V → P x is prepared to input any value x of type V and then behave as the process P x .
External choice
If P and Q are processes then P Q is the process that can behave either as P or as Q (the selection is dictated by its environment). In addition to binary choice, there is an indexed choice operator. If I is an indexing set then i∈I P i is a process that behaves as one of the indexed processes P i .
Parallel composition
If P and Q are processes and A is a set of events then P |[ A ]| Q is a process that behaves as P and Q running in parallel, with the proviso that they must synchronise on the events in A (i.e. for a ∈ A to occur, both P and Q must participate in its occurrence). There is an indexed parallel composition operator in which all indexed processes P i must synchronise on the events in A. This is written as |[ A ]| i∈I P i .
A special case of parallel composition is when A = ∅. The process P |[ ∅ ]| Q behaves as P and Q running independently of each other. This is called the interleaving of P and Q. Binary interleaving is written in CSP as P ||| Q, and the indexed interleaving of processes P i is written ||| i∈I P i .
Recursion
It is also possible to define recursive processes in CSP. For example, by assigning a name V M to the following process:
and by allowing the process to call V M itself, we can represent a vending machine with infinite capacity. Alternatively, we can write this as:
where the operator µ denotes the 'least' solution to the equation:
Traces
The events of a CSP process correspond to the visible behaviour of the process. At this level of abstraction, it seems natural to equate two CSP processes when they exhibit the same visible behaviour; that is, when they perform the same sequences of events. In general, this notion of equality is not discriminating enough to capture all forms of behaviour-for example, it does not recognise deadlock or non-determinism. However, for the kinds of properties that concern us, it will be sufficient. We shall therefore use a suitable semantic model for CSP processes-the so-called traces model [9] .
A trace of a process is a finite list of events that can be performed by the process in the order prescribed by the list. A trace is represented by a sequence of events surrounded by angled brackets ( denotes the empty trace). For example, , coin , coin, choc and coin, choc, coin are traces of the process V M defined above. The concatenation of two traces t 1 and t 2 is written t 1 t 2 . If A is a set of events then t A is the maximal subsequence of t all of whose events are in A. We can define a prefix relation between traces as follows:
For example, coin, choc coin, choc, coin . In the traces model, a CSP process P is denoted by the set of all traces that can be performed by the process; this is written as traces(P ). The set of traces of any process P meets two fundamental properties:
The first property states that all processes can be observed to do nothing. The second property states that the set of traces is prefix-closed-it must be possible to observe a prefix of any observable trace.
Equality in the traces model can be used to define a notion of equality for processes. For process P and Q, we define:
One consequence of the definition of traces is
Therefore, input prefixing can be viewed as syntactic sugar and, as such, it is not implemented in the PVS embedding described in Section 2.4.
Trace specifications
As well as trace equality, we are also interested in other properties of traces. A trace specification is defined to be any predicate on traces, and we say that a process P satisfies a trace specification S if, and only if, all its traces satisfy the predicate. Formally:
This kind of specification is called a safety specification. For example, if length(tr) denotes the length of the trace tr then:
i.e. the number of bars of chocolate dispensed is always less than, or equal to, the number of coins deposited.
Event based authentication
Security properties can be formalised as trace specifications so that any violation in the specification corresponds to a breach of the security property. We begin by assuming that each event has a message component containing a piece of information. For secrecy, we aim to prove that a message m is not learnt by an eavesdropper. This is modelled in CSP by defining an eavesdropper that is willing to perform an event, say leak.m , for every message m that he knows. (We are not concerned with the modelling of the eavesdropper's knowledge at this stage.) If NET is the process that combines the communicating agents, the eavesdropper and any other components of the communications network, then we say that m is secret if:
NET sat λtr.tr {leak.m} = i.e. the event leak.m is not in any trace of NET .
We interpret authentication as a causal dependence between sets of events: an event set T authenticates another event set R if, for all traces, the occurrence of an event in T is preceded by an event in R. More formally, we define:
This definition of authentication corresponds to weak agreement in [12] .
It is possible to define secrecy as an instance of authentication: if T = {leak.m} and R = ∅ then:
T authenticates R = λtr.true ⇒ tr {leak.m} = = λtr.tr {leak.m} = Thus, we shall concentrate on properties of the form T authenticates R. 2 
A proof strategy for authentication
In order to prove properties of the form T authenticates R, [18] proposes a novel approach based on message invariants. This approach was developed with a specific network architecture in mind: a CSP representation of the Dolev-Yao model [2] in which an interleaved set of agent processes communicate via a medium that is under the control of a (potentially) malicious process. This process, which we shall call ENEMY , has the potential to block, re-direct, duplicate or fake messages on the medium. However, when co-operating with the agents, it accepts a message on an agent's transmitting channel and passes the message on the intended agent's receiving channel: the event trans.i.j.m is interpreted as agent i attempting to send message m to agent j , and rec.i.j.m corresponds to agent i receiving message m (apparently) from agent j . Malicious behaviour is achieved by parameterising ENEMY with a set of messages S that can be used to construct 'fake' messages (i.e. messages that have not originated from an agent). Such a message can be used to deceive any agent that is willing to receive it. All messages sent by the agents are added to S since they are visible to the enemy process (although encrypted parts may be unreadable), and any message m that reaches an agent is constructed from S via a generates relation . The construction of m from S is written S m.
The entire network architecture is then defined as:
where USER i is the process describing the behaviour of agent i, and I NI T is the enemy's initial knowledge set. This architecture with three agents (i.e. U = {A, B, C}) is depicted in Fig. 1 . Each protocol is modelled by defining USER i to be agent i running the protocol faithfully.
Schneider's rank theorem
Rather than proving authentication properties directly, Schneider proposes a method that allows the network to be separated into its components and analysed 'locally'. The first step in this approach is to observe that:
Parallel composition with Stop blocks NET on performing the events in R. Thus, we only have to prove that no events in T can be performed in the blocked system in order to verify the authentication property. This is achieved by constructing an invariant on the events' message components. If the invariant holds for every message that can be sent on the blocked network, but it does not hold for the message components of the events in T then no such event can occur. A rank function ρ is a mapping from the network's message space to the set of integers. The invariant chosen by Schneider is λm.ρ(m) 1. That is, only messages of 'positive rank' are allowed to pass on the network. Since the definition of NET is fixed, Schneider derives four conditions that are sufficient to prove that this is an invariant of the (blocked) network; this is Schneider's rank theorem:
If there exists a function ρ such that
where msg(e) extracts the message component from an event e, and maintains I on i is the following trace predicate:
λtr.∀m ∈ (tr ⇓ rec.i).I (m) ⇒ ∀m ∈ (tr ⇓ trans.i).I (m) 3 The first two conditions ensure that the enemy can only generate messages with a positive rank, the third condition formalises the invariant's obligation for the events in T , and the fourth condition ensures that each agent (blocked on the events in R) maintains the invariant (i.e. if everything received by an agent is of positive rank then everything sent must also be of positive rank).
A number of proof rules are given in [18] to aid the proof of condition (4)-the condition that ensures all agents (blocked on the events in R) 'maintain the rank'. These are rules concerning the blocking of events in R (examples of these rules are shown in Fig. 2 ), and rules for maintaining the rank (examples of these rules are shown in Fig. 3 ).
Rule restrict.1 states that a process is unaffected by blocking if it cannot perform an event in R. The rules restrict.2 and restrict.3 describe the effect of blocking on input and output events.
Rule stop in Fig. 3 states that Stop always maintains the rank. Rule output states that a process performing an output maintains the rank if the output message is of positive rank and the process's subsequent behaviour maintains the rank. Rule input states that a process performing an input maintains the rank if on the assumption that the message received is of positive rank, then the process's subsequent behaviour maintains the rank. The function f denotes the pattern matching that occurs at the process interface.
PVS
PVS [13] is a general purpose tool that provides a formal environment for the development and analysis of specifications. A PVS specification consists of one or more ASCII text files that are prepared, modified and analysed using an Emacs interface. The two main components of the PVS system are the specification language itself and the interactive theorem prover.
The PVS specification language
A typical PVS specification consists of a collection of modular units called theories. A hierarchy of theories is constructed by IMPORTING theories into other theories. This makes the definitions and theorems of the imported theories available to the importing theories.
Types
The PVS language is typed. Simple types are constructed from the base types (i.e. bool, nat, etc.) by using function, [· · · ->· · ·], and tuple, [· · ·,· · ·], constructors. (Sets and predicates are implemented as boolean functions (i.e. functions of type [· · ·-> bool]); the terms 'set', 'predicate', and 'boolean function' are used interchangeably in this context.) The versatility of the language is enhanced by allowing uninterpreted type declarations, predicate subtyping, dependent types, enumerated types and abstract datatypes. The price paid for such an expressive type system is the undecidability of typechecking: if PVS is unable to typecheck an expression, it generates one or more proof obligations called type correctness conditions (TCCs). These must be proven before the expression can be considered to be well typed. See the PVS Language Reference [14] for a detailed description of the language.
Constant declarations
A constant declaration refers to a (well-typed) object defined within a theory.
Formula declarations
A logical formula is a boolean expression that is constructed by using the logical connectives OR, AND, NOT, IMPLIES (=>), IFF, etc. Formulae can also contain variables as long as they are bound to the universal quantifier FORALL or the existential quantifier EXISTS. Any free variables are automatically bound to a universal quantifier. A formula declaration associates a formula name with a logical formula via one of the following keywords: AXIOM, ASSUMPTION, LEMMA, or THEOREM. The differences between these keywords are due to the proofs of the associated formulae. An AXIOM is not expected to have an associated proof, an ASSUMPTION is expected to be proved only by an importing theory, and a LEMMA or a THEOREM (they can be used interchangeably) always requires a proof.
Abstract datatypes
PVS has a mechanism for user-defined (recursive) datatypes. The class of datatypes that can be defined using this mechanism, see [15] , is constrained to ensure that the resulting definitions and axioms generated by PVS are valid. (The uniformity with which these definitions and axioms are generated also permits a high degree of automation for the theorem prover.) In PVS, an abstract datatype is defined in a DATATYPE construct. From this, PVS generates axioms and definitions that can be used to reason about objects of this type. For example, a list datatype (whose elements are of a parametric type T) is defined as follows: where null and cons are the constructors, car and cdr are accessors that identify the two arguments of the cons constructor, and null? and cons? are recognisers (functions of type [list -> bool]) that are true for null-lists and non-null-lists respectively.
Among the axioms generated by PVS is an extensionality axiom (for checking the equality of two lists), and an induction axiom. Among the constant declarations generated by PVS is the every function.
every(p : [T -> bool])(l : list) : bool = CASES l OF null : TRUE, cons(hd, tl) : p(hd) AND every(p)(tl) ENDCASES
This takes a predicate on the list elements and returns a predicate for lists. That is, every(p) is true for a list all of whose elements satisfy the predicate p; we shall make extensive use of this function. The CASES · · · ENDCASES expression introduces pattern matching to constant declarations involving abstract datatypes.
The PVS theorem prover
The proofs of formulae are constructed via the PVS theorem prover. It is primarily used in an interactive mode whereby a user submits proof commands at a prompt within the prover window. The prover maintains a proof tree whose nodes are called proof goals. It is the aim of the user to close all the branches of the proof tree using the proof commands. (A branch is closed if its leaf node can be recognised as true by the theorem prover.) See the PVS Prover Guide [20] for details of the theorem prover.
Each proof goal is a sequent consisting of a list of antecedent formulae followed by a list of consequent formulae separated by '|-------'. Any proof command entered at the prompt is applied to the 'current' proof goal. Intuitively, a sequent can be read as, 'If the conjunction of the antecedents is true then the disjunction of the consequents is true.'
A proof begins with a single (root) node whose sequent comprises a single consequent formula. This formula corresponds to the boolean expression of the formula declaration to be proved. The proof proceeds in a 'backward' manner by the issuing of proof commands until a trivial sequent is derived. (Some proof commands spawn additional subgoals each of which has to be tackled separately.)
Proof commands
Primitive proof commands such as flatten, split, inst and skolem! manipulate the formulae within a sequent at a very low level. It is rare for a PVS user to issue primitive proof commands during a proof. Higher level proof commands called strategies are combinations of primitive proof steps which reduce the amount of user intervention. For example, assert is a general purpose strategy for simplifying formulae.
A rewrite rule is a formula declaration that is applied to a proof goal directly using the rewrite strategy. Rewrite rules are usually equations or one-way implications. If the rewrite rule is an equation e1 = e2 then rewrite attempts to match an expression in the proof goal with e1. The first occurrence of such a match is then replaced by e2. If the rewrite rule is an implication f1 => f2 then rewrite attempts to match f2 with a consequent formula. If a match is found then f1 is added to the list of consequent formulae.
User defined strategies
PVS allows users to define their own strategies by combining proof commands so that 'patterns' of proof steps can be applied in a single command. User defined strategies are held in a text file called pvs-strategies.
A PVS embedding of CSP
A trace semantics for the CSP operators defined in Section 2.1 has been implemented in PVS [3] . Sets and lists (see Section 2.3.2) are among the pre-defined types provided by the PVS system, and these form the basis for the implementation. Traces are defined as lists, and processes are defined as sets of traces. Since the list datatype is polymorphic, we are not constrained to any specific set of events.
The standard CSP notation cannot be used for this embedding because PVS specifications are ASCII text files. However, PVS has a collection of infix operators which provide an alternative syntax for CSP processes. The notation for the CSP embedding in shown in Table 1 . The suffix ! of the names Choice and Interleave is a notation abbreviation provided by PVS that allows names to be treated as binding expressions. Choice! (i : I) : P(i) is equivalent to Choice(LAMBDA (i : I) : P(i)). (This shall also be used in conjunction with the every combinator defined in Section 2.3.2.) Table 1 The CSP operators in PVS
Interleave! (i:I) : P(i)
We also introduce a blocking operator # in which P # A is an abbreviation for the process Par(A) (P, Stop).
The traces model
A trace is defined to be a list. The empty trace is therefore represented by the empty list constructor null, and events can be prefixed onto an existing trace using the list constructor cons. The prefix relation can be defined in terms of the pre-defined list operation append: prefix(t1, t2) : bool = EXISTS t : t2 = append(t1, t)
Recall that the set of traces of a process must fulfil two conditions: the empty trace must be in the set, and it must be prefix-closed. We define a type process to be a subtype in which these two conditions are fulfilled: A fixed point operator mu is also defined which, given a monotonic functional F of type [process -> process], returns its least fixed point mu(F). This is generalised to allow recursive definitions of parameterised processes.
Trace specifications
The satisfaction relation sat is implemented using the infix operator |>. Recall that any trace predicate is a legitimate trace specification. Therefore, |> is defined to be a subset relation between processes P and sets of traces S.
P |> S : bool = subset?(P, S)
One important consequence of this definition is a transitive property between different trace specifications: sat_transitive : LEMMA P |> S AND subset?(S, T) IMPLIES P |> T An example of a trace specification in PVS is auth(T, R) that implements the property T authenticates R:
From this definition, we can prove the following lemma which expresses authentication in terms of the every combinator and the blocking operator:
authentication_equiv : LEMMA P |> auth(T, R) IFF P # R |> every(complement(T))
The (original) rank theorem in PVS
The implementation of the rank theorem in [3] has been used to analyse several authentication protocols [1, 4, 6] . However, this implementation has several drawbacks due, to some extent, to the authors' adherence to the network model presented in [18] .
The first major drawback is the position of the event datatype in the theory hierarchy. Its location (below the theories that contain the rewrite rules) makes it difficult to analyse other network models without severe alterations to the theories that lie above it. The next section develops a set of rewrite rules that are independent of the event datatype and, therefore, more widely applicable.
The second drawback concerns input and output. The CSP embedding has no notion of input and output events, yet the rewrite rules interpret (from the agents' point of view) trans as an output event and rec as an input event. As we shall see, by abandoning this preconception, in favour of a notion that we shall informally refer to as delegation, we can derive a more general set of rewrite rules. For example, we show that the rewrite rules concerning input and output in [3] (the implementation of rules input and output in Fig.  3 ) are in fact instances of a single prefix rule.
The final drawback is the proof of the rank theorem itself: it is rather ad hoc and unnecessarily complicated. For example, a constraint is introduced which forces all agents to communicate on their own trans and rec channels. Although this will be the case in general, it is not required in the proof of the rank theorem. The generality of the rewrite rules developed in the next section is demonstrated by using them in the proof of the rank theorem itself!
Generalising the rank approach in PVS
The rank approach presented in the previous section considers only one threat model, in which all users communicate via the enemy on channels called trans and rec. Whilst it is possible to investigate many situations within this model, from a PVS perspective it is possible to increase both the flexibility of the approach and the efficiency of its implementation. By increasing flexibility it is possible to allow users of the system to:
• develop their own threat models, • declare CSP events that reflect different scenarios,
• have a suite of PVS strategies that can be used more widely, • construct specialised rank theorems by using the system itself.
By improving efficiency we aim to raise the level of interaction between the user and the theorem prover. Ideally, this would involve increasing the amount of automation at lower, more mundane, levels whilst allowing interaction at a level that is meaningful to the non-PVS expert.
Uniform properties
Perhaps the biggest hurdle in generalising the approach is to abandon some of the concepts on which the theory is based. In particular, in the previous section, we spoke of an agent maintaining the rank if everything received on an input channel has positive rank implies everything transmitted on an output channel has a positive rank. The CSP operators defined in PVS (specifically, event prefixing) have no notion of input and output, yet we have already mentioned an implementation of the rank theorem using PVS. It is, therefore, possible to define a rank theorem in a setting that is without a notion of input and output. By abandoning this notion we treat all events in a uniform manner and, as a consequence, define proof rules that are independent of specific events. The remainder of this section concerns the development of these rules.
The whole approach, as defined in the previous section, centres on the construction of a rank function that maps all messages that are allowed to pass on a network to a positive integer, and maps all messages that are forbidden on the network to a non-positive integer. Rather than using all integers as the range of the rank function, the 'revised' definition in [8] restricts the range to the values '1' (representing all positive values) and '0' (representing all non-positive values). We shall use this revision by defining a rank function that maps messages to boolean values. Using the every combinator defined in Section 2.3.2, the central property of a (boolean) rank function rho can be expressed as:
every! e : rho(msg(e))
That is, the message component of every event e satisfies rho. Properties of this form (for lists and other algebraic datatypes) are investigated in [10] using the collective term 'uniform properties'.
Rewrite rules for uniform properties
In an authentication context, we want to show that a process P blocked on a set of events R satisfies the rank property. That is, we want to prove:
P # R |> every! e : rho(msg(e))
A proof of this can be achieved by splitting the process P into its subcomponents. We will consider each CSP operator in turn to construct rewrite rules for formulae such as this. We begin by constructing rules for uniform properties of the form every(p). We shall discover that we also need to consider properties of the form LAMBDA t : every(p)(t) => every(q)(t), for event predicates p and q. It is easy to see that the first form is an instance of the second (since every(TRUE)(t) = TRUE), but we shall consider each of these forms separately.
There are two kinds of rewrite rule that we shall construct. The first kind deals with the blocking of a process on an arbitrary set of events R. Some of these rules are given in Fig. 2 under the heading 'rules for restricted parallel combinations'; a complete set of rules is given in this section. The second kind of rewrite rule concerns the uniform properties stated above. Since the rank property defined above is one instance, these rules are used extensively in proofs of security properties, as well as in the proof of the rank theorem itself.
Stop
The rules for this process are straightforward because blocking has no effect, and properties of the form every(p) are vacuously true for the null trace: 
Event prefixing
If this process a >> P is blocked on a set R containing the event a then it deadlocks immediately (i.e. it is equivalent to Stop) otherwise the event a is allowed to happen, and blocking can be restricted to P. 
Parallel composition
Each parallel operator is parameterised by a synchronising set of A. Once again, we define two blocking rules that distribute the blocking over all operand processes. The problem of establishing every(p) for a parallel process can be split into two subcases: by considering the events that are members of the synchronising set A and the events that are not members separately, we derive the following lemma from the definition of every: The events that are not in A do not require synchronisation, and both P1 and P2 must be shown to satisfy every! e : (NOT A(e) => p(e)): Since all events in A require synchronisation then if either P1 or P2 satisfies the property every! e : (A(e) => p(e)) then their parallel composition will satisfy the property. However, it is unrealistic to expect one of the subprocesses to take sole responsibility for achieving this. One alternative is for each subprocesses P1 and P2 to delegate responsibility for a subset of the events in A so that in combination they satisfy the property: if, on the assumption that p holds for a set of delegated events, it can be shown that p holds for all other events then the parallel composition satisfies every(p). Note that the scope of this assumption includes the events not in A and, as a consequence, this rule subsumes parallel_property2. We call this rewrite rule uniform_par (note the two delegating sets B1 and B2 must be disjoint):
uniform_par : LEMMA EXISTS B1, B2 : subset?(B1, A) AND subset?(B2, A) AND disjoint?(B1, B2) AND P1 |> LAMBDA t : (every! e : B1(e) => p(e))(t) => (every! e : complement(B1)(e) => p(e))(t) AND P2 |> LAMBDA t : (every! e : B2(e) => p(e))(t) => (every! e : complement(B2)(e) => p(e))(t) IMPLIES Par(A)(P1, P2) |> every(p)
The prefix-closed nature of processes breaks the apparent circularity of this lemma. Also note that we have now introduced two properties of the form LAMBDA t : every(p)(t) => every(q)(t).
Each step in the derivation of uniform_par can be generalised to define a rule for indexed parallel composition. Instead of two delegating sets we need an indexed collection of (disjoint) delegating sets. 
Fixed points
All of the blocking rules that have been considered up to this point have manipulated a blocked process by moving the restriction to its subprocesses. However, this does not work for fixed point definitions (see [5] for a counterexample). Instead, the following rules are defined for the blocking of fixed point processes: In both rules, the hypothesis means, in effect, that F is only allowed to extend traces by prefixing additional events. It cannot manipulate traces by, for example, renaming events; these rules are sufficient for our purposes.
In order to prove that a (parameterless) recursive process mu(F) satisfies a property of the form every(p), it is sufficient to find a stronger event predicate p1 (i.e. for all events e, p1(e) => p(e)) such that every(p1) can be proved by fixed point induction: uniform_fix1 : LEMMA (EXISTS p1 : (FORALL e : p1(e) => p(e)) AND (FORALL X : X |> every(p1) IMPLIES F(X) |> every(p1))) IMPLIES mu(F) |> every(p)
For parameterised recursive processes we get a similar rule. Note that the event predicates all occur within the scope of universally quantified variables. This allows the event predicates to be dependent on the process's parameter.
uniform2_fix : LEMMA (EXISTS p1 : (FORALL e : p1(i)(e) IMPLIES p(e)) AND FORALL X : (FORALL i : X(i) |> every(p1(i))) IMPLIES FORALL i : F(X)(i) |> every(p1(i))) IMPLIES mu(F)(i) |> every(p)
Yet more rules Recall that the rules for parallel composition yield uniform properties of the form LAMBDA t : every(p)(t) => every(q)(t). It is therefore necessary to derive rules for these properties too. The prefixing rule is particularly interesting because the input and output rules of Fig. 3 are both instances of the same rule. That is, we now have a single rewrite rule that does not discriminate between input and output:
uniform_prefix2 : LEMMA p(e) => (q(e) AND P |> LAMBDA t : every(p)(t) => every(q)(t)) IMPLIES e >> P |> LAMBDA t : every(p)(t) => every(q)(t)
Strategies for the rewrite rules
A set of PVS strategies have been constructed to control the application of the numerous rewrite rules presented above. Each strategy corresponds to a particular CSP operator. For example, the strategy for binary parallel composition is called parallel, fix2 is the strategy for parameterised fixed point definitions, and interleaving2 is the strategy for indexed interleaving. (The definitions of these and the other strategies can be found in [5] .)
Deriving a rank theorem in PVS
We now use the strategies highlighted above to derive a rank theorem for a specific network model-the 'Dolev-Yao' model described in Section 2.2 (i.e. the network architecture depicted in Fig. 1 generalised to an arbitrary number of agents). However, in addition to the trans and rec channels, we include a new channel called leak on which the enemy can pass any message that it is capable of generating. This channel can be used in the analysis of secrecy properties (as demonstrated in [5] ). We define a datatype called event to represent the alphabet of the CSP processes: The types I and M are parameters representing agent identities and messages respectively. The network is, therefore, defined to be polymorphic with respect to these types.
Next we define the enemy. Recall, this is a recursive process that is parameterised by a set of messages. Any message that is received (via the trans channel) is added to the set of messages. Only messages generated from the current set of messages using the generates relation |-can be sent on the rec and leak channels. We introduce a parameter for the network (called users) that maps agent identities to processes. For each protocol that is to be analysed using this network architecture, this parameter can be instantiated accordingly. We now derive Schneider's rank theorem using the PVS theorem prover. By submitting network(users) |> auth(T, R) to the theorem prover, we use the strategies to obtain the conditions of the theorem: If we split this formula, we get two subgoals. The first subgoal demands that all messages passing on the blocked network belong to rho. The second requires the set of traces that satisfy every! e: rho(msg(e)) to be a subset of the set of traces satisfying every(complement(T)). In other words, the messages of the events of T are not members of rho.
Maintaining the rank
The first of these two subgoals is in a form that is amenable to our proof strategies. The strategy parallel is used to split the network into two subcomponents: the enemy and the agents. We delegate responsibility for all trans events to the agents, and delegate responsibility for all rec events to the enemy (leak is not delegated because it is not in the synchronising set): LAMBDA t : every! e : (B1(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) => every! e : (complement(B1)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) AND Interleave(users) # R |> LAMBDA t : every! e : (B2(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) => every! e : (complement(B2)(e) => rho(msg(e)))(t) Rule? (inst 1 "trans?" "rec?") This simplifies to:
|-------{1} subset?(trans?, union(trans?, rec?)) AND subset?(rec?, union(trans?, rec?)) AND disjoint?(trans?, rec?) AND enemy(INIT) # R |> LAMBDA t : every! e : (trans?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) => every! e : (complement(trans?)(e) => rho(msg(e)))(t) AND Interleave(users) # R |> LAMBDA t : every! e : (rec?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) => every! e : (complement(rec?)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) This is simplified to obtain two subgoals that require us to prove that the blocked enemy and the interleaved, blocked agents maintain the rank.
The enemy maintains the rank
In an authentication analysis, the effect of blocking the enemy on performing the events in R is negligible because the behaviour of the enemy is so unconstrained. Thus, we discard the block and continue to derive the conditions necessary to prove that the enemy maintains the rank. Since the enemy is defined as a parameterised fixed point (of the functional F), the fix2 strategy is used in the proof of the following sequent: We are required to instantiate the variables q1 and q2 so that the property LAMBDA t : every(q1(i))(t) => every(q2(i))(t) is preserved by the application of F. A suitable instantiation for q1 is LAMBDA S : LAMBDA e : (trans?(e) => rho(msg(e)))
The instantiation for q2 is a bit more complicated because it deals with the enemy's rec and leak events. These events are dependent on the set of messages and the generates relation. As the set of messages increases with each trans event, we require a parameterised event predicate that can accommodate this expansion. We therefore choose the following instantiation for q2:
LAMBDA S : LAMBDA e : (complement(trans?)(e) AND subset?(S, rho)) => (EXISTS S1 : subset?(S1, rho) AND S1 |-msg(e))
The existentially quantified variable S1 gives us flexibility with regard to the set of messages. In simple terms, this predicate says that the messages occurring in all rec and leak events are generated from a subset of the messages in rho. This predicate is only suitable if the following two conditions hold: The agents maintain the rank Since the agents are undefined, we cannot do much to simplify the following sequent. The only strategy available to us is the interleaving2 strategy. This results in a formula that cannot be reduced any further:
LAMBDA t : every! e : (rec?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) => every! e : (complement(rec?)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t)
Rule? (interleaving2) This simplifies to:
|-------{1} users(i) # R |> LAMBDA t : every! e : (rec?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) => every! e : (complement(rec?)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t)
Thus, every agent i must be shown to maintain the rank.
The events in T The remaining subgoal concerns the events in the set T:
|-------{1} subset?(every! e: rho(msg(e)), every(complement(T))) This is true if the message of an event in T is not a member of rho:
• FORALL (e: (T)): NOT rho(msg(e))
The rank theorem By combining the results above, we obtain the following rank theorem: where RankUser(rho) is defined as follows:
RankUser(rho) : setof[trace[event]] = LAMBDA t : every! e : (rec?(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t) => every! e : (complement(rec?)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(t)
This theorem coincides with the rank theorem defined in Section 2.2.
Dolev-Yao variations 1: Non-repudiation
In this section we shall define an alternative network model to investigate certain properties of a non-repudiation protocol proposed by Zhou and Gollmann in [21] . The properties of the non-repudiation protocol that we can investigate are those that can be analysed by using rank functions. Thus, we are concerned with the safety aspects of the protocol (i.e. the non-repudiation of origin properties).
Since non-repudiation is different from authentication, the motivation for analysing non-repudiation protocols is not to establish the correctness of the protocols specifically. Rather, the analysis is done in order to assess the strength of the evidence that can be generated by the agents. Such protocols are used to provide evidence that can be submitted to a judge so that other agents cannot successfully deny having sent or received a message.
The Zhou-Gollmann protocol
This protocol aims to provide non-repudiation evidence for an originator A sending a message M to a recipient B. There are two stages to the protocol: the first stage is the communication, from A to B, of the message M encrypted using a key K generated by the originator A. Non-repudiation of origin evidence is provided by A signing the encrypted message. On receipt, B provides non-repudiation of receipt evidence by signing the encrypted message and sending it back to A. When A has received this evidence, the second stage involves the distribution of the key K that will enable B to get M. A submits K to a trusted third party T T P who makes the key (signed by the trusted third party) available to both A and B via ftp-get operations. A is required to retrieve this key in order to get the evidence needed for non-repudiation of receipt: if A is capable of retrieving K via an ftp-get, it is assumed that B can also get the key. This protocol is analysed in [5] .
Non-repudiation in PVS
The model for non-repudiation is orthogonal to the Dolev-Yao model: in a non-repudiation setting, it is the agents that have the potential to misbehave, whilst the medium is reliable. However, properties concerning non-repudiation of origin (NRO) are very similar to event-based authentication properties: one agent's receipt of a message (that can be submitted as a piece of evidence to the judge) guarantees that another (specific) agent sent it.
A network definition for NRO
We shall use the network architecture depicted in Fig. 4 . The agents (including A and B shown in the diagram), the medium, and the trusted third party (T T P ) are defined as CSP processes. Note that the evidence channels in the diagram are unconnected at one end. In CSP, this corresponds to communication with an environment that is external to the model. In our case, it means that we do not model the judge as a CSP process. Thus, we are not analysing the capabilities of the judge; we are analysing the strength of the evidence submitted to the judge. The trans and rec channels each have two identity fields. This is necessary for the medium to determine the source and destination of messages passed on these channels.
The medium
Unlike the enemy, we assume that the medium is reliable: any message sent to the medium is made available to the intended recipient of the message (and no-one else). Once a message has been passed on, it is removed from the medium. This is reflected in the following definition: where add puts an element (a triple in this case) into a set, and remove deletes an element from a set. The parameter S represents the set of transmitted messages that have yet to reach their destinations. Note that the source and destination fields of the trans event are swapped when they are added to S. The rec event is constructed by projecting the components of a triple.
The agents
All agents have the potential to misbehave: each agent i is parameterised by a set of messages and has a generates relation |-(i) by which he creates messages. An agent can receive any message (which is then added to its set) and is willing to transmit any message that can be generated (from its set) to anyone. In addition to this, an agent is willing to accept any message on its ftp channel, and it can submit any message that can be generated from its set as evidence. The parameter u is the identity of an agent, and Su represents the agent's set of messages.
The Network
The agents and the trusted third party communicate directly via the ftp channels. They can also communicate with each other indirectly via the medium. Since the trusted third party is uninterpreted at this stage, we define the network as a process that is parameterised by the trusted third party's process: The theory parameter INIT is a function that maps an agent's identity to a message set that represents the messages that are in the agent's possession initially.
A rank theorem for NRO
Since we have restricted ourselves to the safety aspects of the ZG protocol, we are once again interested in proving properties of the form auth(T, R). For non-repudiation, only evidence events should be allowed in T because our aim is to evaluate the strength of the evidence that can be passed to the judge (i.e. to establish what can be deduced from the evidence in T). We choose to constrain the theory so that T is a set consisting of one evidence event. The intention is to use a specialised rank theorem to get a minimal set of events that must be included in R (the blocking set) in order to prove that the network meets the specification. The events in R correspond to the possible events that could cause the piece of evidence in T to be submitted. Thus, the evidence in T is weaker as the size of R increases.
We begin the development of a rank theorem for non-repudiation by defining a function T that maps an agent's identity i and a message m to a singleton set consisting of the event evidence(i, m).
T(i, m) : setof[event] = singleton(evidence(i, m))
For an arbitrary set R, we want to build a rank theorem by which we can prove properties of the form:
network(TTP) |> auth(T(i, m), R)
To do this, we repeat the first steps of the proof of authentication_by_rank described in the previous section. However, since the definition of T is restricted to a single evidence event with a specific agent's identity, i, we can ignore all other evidence channels. That is, rather than showing that the entire network, blocked on the events in R, maintains the rank, we only have to show that the messages passing on all of the channels except these redundant evidence channels maintain the rank. If we capture these evidence channels as a set of events: then we want to show that the network blocked on R satisfies the following trace property: every! e : (not_redundant_evidence(i))(e) => rho(msg(e))
Once again, we can use the strategies to separate the network process into its components. This process consists of a nested parallel combination, and we are required to use the parallel2 strategy twice in order to separate the network components completely. This results in a delegation of responsibility for the events among the agents, the trusted third party and the medium. The medium delegates responsibility for all trans events to the agents and the trusted third party. The agents and the trusted third party delegate responsibility for the rec events to the medium. Finally, the agents delegate responsibility for the ftp events to the trusted third party. Thus, we define the following three trace properties: (every! e : rec?(e) => rho(msg(e)))(tr) => (every! e : complement(rec?)(e) => (not_redundant_evidence(i)(e) => rho(msg(e))))(tr)
Now, in order to prove network(TTP) |> auth(T(i, m), R), it is sufficient to prove the following four subgoals: 1. medium(emptyset) |> RankMedium(rho) 2. FORALL u : user(INIT(u))(u) # R |> RankUser(i, rho) 3. TTP # R |> RankTTP(i, rho) 4. NOT rho(m)
The first of these is true whatever the rank function because a medium that is empty initially will continue to maintain the rank. The other conditions obviously depend on rho, and result in the following rank theorem that we call nonrepudiation_by_rank: nonrepudiation_by_rank : THEOREM The results of the analysis of ZG in [5] require the assumption that agents do not reveal their private keys.
Dolev-Yao variations 2: Adding time
In this section we shall introduce event-based (discrete) time to the network model. By using discrete time, rather than real time, we can continue to use our proof strategies. Thus, no modifications to the CSP embedding are required to analyse event-based timed properties of security protocols. Discrete time is modelled in CSP by introducing a special event tock. The resulting language is called tock-CSP. The event tock is used to represent the passage of one unit of time, and it requires synchronisation by all processes in the system to reflect the fact that time passes at the same rate in all processes. Detailed accounts of event-based time, can be found in [17, 19] .
Timed processes
We augment the original Dolev-Yao model of the network by adding timed behaviour. The revised enemy is simply the original enemy with no time-critical behaviour. However, an agents' behaviour can be sensitive to time for a number of reasons:
• The messages they produce can depend on the current time (e.g. timestamps), and so the agents will have to be described explicitly in tock-CSP. They will also need to keep track of the current time, and increment its value on every tock. • The response to a particular message might depend on the relationship between the current time and a time value within the message (to check that it is recent enough). • The implementation of the protocol might include other time-dependent behaviour such as timeouts or explicit delays. Furthermore, time can be introduced into the authentication properties that need to be checked. It may be necessary to check that a message received was in fact sent relatively recently; or perhaps that an entire protocol run has taken no more than a certain amount of time. If timestamps appear in the messages then such properties can be expressed within the existing framework. For example, if m is a message and l is a timestamp, then {rec.B.A.m.l} might be used to authenticate {trans.A.B.m.l | l − d l l}. In other words, m was sent no more than d time units ago.
We begin by adding the event tock to the event datatype. Note that this event has no message component and, as such, the rank theorem for timed networks must be redefined. 
A rank theorem for the model
Prior to the addition of time, our invariant for the Dolev-Yao network was that all messages passing on the network were members of the set rho. Since every event had a message component, this was defined in PVS as the following trace property: every! e : rho(msg(e))
In the timed setting, we have introduced the event tock that does not contain a message component. This invariant is no longer applicable because msg(tock) is meaningless (it does not typecheck). We therefore define a timed invariant in which the message components of all events except tock are members of rho: every! e : complement(tock?)(e) => rho(msg(e))
The type conflict is now avoided because PVS typechecks the expression rho(msg(e)) under the assumption that e / = tock. Once again, we construct a rank theorem to prove properties of the form auth(T, R). We derive a theorem that is almost identical to that of the untimed network: where RankUser(rho) is defined as:
LAMBDA tr : (every! e : rec?(e) => rho(msg(e)))(tr) => (every! e : complement(union(rec?, tock?))(e) => rho(msg(e)))(tr)
The only difference is an additional constraint on the set T: it must not contain the event tock. This is not only the consequence of a type conflict, it is also necessary in the proof of the theorem. We are required to show that the timed invariant given above is stronger than the trace property every(complement(T)). This is the case if, for every event e: (complement(tock?)(e) => rho(msg(e))) IMPLIES NOT T(e) If tock is a member of T then the hypothesis of the implication would be true and the consequent would be false. Hence, we are obliged to forbid this.
A timed example: The (corrected) Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol
The Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol is a simple two-pass protocol that uses timestamps. Its aim is to send a session key from one agent to another via a server. The corrected version of this protocol is defined as follows:
Here, the agent A initiates a run of the protocol by sending message (1) to the server S. On receipt of this message, the server checks that the value of the timestamp T a is acceptably close to the 'current' time. If this is the case then the server constructs message (2), generating a new timestamp T s, and sends it to the intended recipient B. If this message is received within an acceptable time period (i.e. T s is deemed to be recent) then B is willing to use Kab as a session key with A. Note, the protocol uses shared key encryption for secure communication with the server. The message components i and r are 'direction bits' that are required to distinguish the first message from the second.
In this example, we consider a network with only three agents: an initiator A, a responder B, and a server S. (In general we are not constrained by a finite number of agents.) The agents are defined in the PVS embedding as follows:
FUserA(X)(n) : process = trans(A, S, E(Kas, conc(A, conc4(B, n, Kab, i)))) >> RUN(tock) \/ tock >> X(n + 1)
UserA : [nat -> process] = mu(FUserA) FUserB(X)(n) : process = Choice!(k, (n' | n' >= n -d AND n >= n')) : rec(B, S, E(Kbs, conc4(A, n', k, r))) >> RUN(tock) \/ tock >> X(n + 1) UserB : [nat -> process] = mu(FUserB) FServer(X)(n) : process = Choice!(k, (n' | n' >= n -d AND n >= n')) : rec(S, A, E(Kas, conc(A, conc4(B, n', k, i)))) >> trans(S, B, E(Kbs, conc4(A, n, k, r))) >> RUN(tock) \/ tock >> X(n + 1) Server : [nat -> process] = mu(FServer) users : process = Par(tock?)(Par(tock?)(UserA(0), UserB(0)), Server (0)) where the natural number parameter n of each process acts as a clock recording the 'current' time, E is the encryption function (whose arguments are the encryption key and the message to be encrypted), and conc and conc4 concatenate two and four messages respectively. The process users sets all clocks to zero and forces all agents to synchronise on tock events. The process RUN(tock) allows time to pass freely once an agent has completed its run. The enemy's initial set of messages INIT contains all agent identities, all session keys except Kab and all timestamps (i.e. the natural numbers). The generates relation is defined to give the enemy process reasonable capabilities:
S |-m : INDUCTIVE bool = (S(m)) OR (EXISTS m1, m2 : S |-m1 AND S |-m2 AND m = conc(m1, m2)) OR (EXISTS m1 : S |-conc(m, m1)) OR (EXISTS m1 : S |-conc(m1, m)) OR (EXISTS k, m1 : S |-k AND S |-m1 AND m = E(k, m1))
An obvious property that we would like to check is whenever B performs its rec event then A initiated the protocol no more than d time units ago. This can be formalised by instantiating the sets T and R in the trace specification auth(T, R) as follows: T = { e | e = rec(B, S, E(Kbs, conc4(A, t, Kab, r))) } R = { e | EXISTS (t' | t' >= t -d AND t >= t') : e = trans(A, S, conc(A, E(Kas, conc4(B, t, Kab, i)))) }
In a rank analysis, we aim to show that, by blocking A on initiating the protocol at time t -d until time t, the event in T cannot occur. Our approach to constructing a rank function is to define an uninterpreted function rho and use the rank theorem and our suite of strategies to derive the conditions that rho must fulfil. Any inconsistency in these conditions indicates a flaw in the protocol with respect to the property under investigation.
The first hypothesis of the rank theorem states that INIT must be a subset of rho. Therefore, rho must contain all agent identities , all session keys except possibly Kab and all timestamps. The second hypothesis states that only messages belonging to rho can be generated from subsets of rho. Thus, for example, the concatenation of two messages in rho forms a message that is also in rho.
The strategies are used to show that the agents maintain the rank. The prefix strategy, that uses the rewrite rule uniform_prefix2, tells us that UserA maintains the rank if rho(E(Kas, conc4(B, n, Kab, i))). However, since the network is blocked on R, this only needs to be true when the timestamp n is less than t -d or greater than t. UserB maintains the rank simply because it does not send anything. By using the same prefix strategy (twice), Server maintains the rank if, for all session keys k and all timestamps n, n': rho(E(Kas, conc4(B, n, k, i))) => rho(E(Kbs, conc4(A, n', k, r)))
where n is greater than n' -d and less than n'.
The final hypothesis states that rho(E(Kbs, conc4(A, t, Kab, r))) must not be in rho. Collectively, these conditions are consistent and rho can be defined accordingly in PVS. Therefore, the property holds.
Summary
The rank function approach has, for some time, been used in the formal analysis of authentication protocols. More recently, its PVS implementation has been developed to provide a more flexible, interactive environment in which a wider range of security properties (not only authentication) can be analysed. The work presented here originated from the desire to allow such properties to be addressed within a single framework. However, this result has also impacted on the theory that underlies the approach.
The realisation that the central rank property is an instance of a more general class of 'uniform' properties has enabled the development of a suite of powerful yet flexible rewrite rules for the rank approach. In particular, we have abandoned the partitioning of events in favour of a more general notion that we have called delegation. As a consequence, rewrite rules for parallel composition have been introduced, and separate prefixing rules for input and output have been replaced by a single, general purpose rule. Hence, the rules, and the rank approach itself, are now polymorphic with respect to events.
The versatility of the rules is demonstrated by using them to derive three specialised rank theorems for three different types of security analysis. Therefore, we have a collection of rewrite rules that, in addition to their role in the construction of rank functions for specific protocol analyses, can be used in the proofs that support the approach itself.
Another approach that also uses rank functions is Heather's RankAnalyser tool [7] . This tool automatically verifies authentication properties for a somewhat restricted class of protocols. Our results increase the range of protocols that are amenable to a rank analysis. In a wider context, security protocols have been investigated using other CSP-based techniques. Casper (see, for example, [11] ) is used in conjunction with the model checker FDR to find attacks on security protocols. Other theorem provers have also been used to analyse security protocols. A well-known example is Paulson's inductive method [16] which has been implemented in the Isabelle theorem prover. This approach is comparable to performing a (highly automated) authentication analysis directly within the traces model. Our use of rank functions to verify trace properties demands more interaction.
